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INTRODUCTION 
Donald Perkl is a person with intellectual disabilities and autism spec-
trum disorder.' After successfully working in a sheltered workshop for 
more than six years, he was hired as a janitor at a local Chuck E. Cheese. 
On Perkl's first day on the job, regional manager Donald Creasy visited the 
restaurant. Seeing Perkl, Creasy instructed store manager Brea Wittwer to 
fire Perkl on the ground that it was Chuck E. Cheese's policy not to hire 
"those kind of people.m Creasy made a similarly dismissive statement re-
garding Perkl's predecessor, another individual with developmental dis-
abilities.3 Wittwer attempted to resist Creasy's order by requesting 
additional time to sort out Perkl's position. She also faxed a plaintive note 
to the human resources department indicating that, although Perkl was 
Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. 
•• Professor, William & Mary School of Law; Executive Director, Harvard Project on Disability. 
We thank Susan Stefan and Penelope Stein for deep reflections on earlier drafts; Kelly Brown for re-
search assistance; and Julie Waterstone for support. Michael Stein's work was supported in part by a 
grant from the Foundation Open Society Institute (Zug). 
1 See EEOC v. CEC Entm't, No. 98-C-698-X, 2000 WL 1339288, at *2 (W.O. Wis. Mar. 14, 2000); 
see also Peter Blanck, First Thornburgh Family Lecture on Disability Law and Policy, Americans with 
Disabilities and Their Civil Rights: Past, Present, and Future, 66 U. Pin. L. REV. 687, 695 (2005) 
[hereinafter Blanck, First Thornburgh] (Professor Blanck testified as an expert witness on Mr. Perkl's 
behalf); Peter Blanck, Justice for All? Stories About Americans with Disabilities and Their Civil Rights, 
8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. I (2004). 
2 CEC Entm 't, 2000 WL 1339288, at *3. 
3 /d. 
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qualified and his accommodations externally paid for, Creasy was intent on 
firing Perkl because of his disabilities. 4 
Perkl continued to work at the restaurant for several more weeks, earn-
ing excellent work evaluations and the esteem and friendship of his co-
workers. However, upon a later visit to Chuck E. Cheese, Creasy 
terminated Perkl's employment after Wittwer refused to do so.5 Wittwer 
and her entire staff resigned in protest and testified on Perkl's behalf in a 
subsequent lawsuit.6 Perkl prevailed at trial, and the jury awarded him legal 
fees, seventy thousand dollars in compensatory damages and thirteen mil-
lion dollars in punitive damages. 7 The trial court later reduced the punitive 
damages award to the statutory maximum.8 Notably, the defendant con-
tended that Perkl's intellectual disability rendered him incapable of experi-
encing emotional distress from the abrupt firing. 9 
The narrative of Donald Perkl's employment discrimination experience 
involves two tightly linked threads. First is the overt bigotry animating 
Creasy's statement that Perkl was inherently inferior and undeserving of 
equal treatment. This form of prejudice drives Mark C. Weber's powerful 
book, Disability Harassment. 10 Second is the equally harmful preconcep-
tion that influenced Chuck E. Cheese's contention that people with cogni-
tive disabilities cannot feel emotional anguish, 11 and by implication, that the 
legal and social standing of people with disabilities is not the same as that 
of other citizens. 
This second theme of unconscious prejudice animates the field of anti-
discrimination law but is an area less explored in Weber's latest book. We 
therefore address invidious, unconscious discrimination in this Review Es-
say by making the case for why people with psycho-social (also called men-
tal) disabilities, 12 who are largely cqnsidered to be among the most 
4 /d. ("Can someone please help me with this situation, so we can at least give this guy a chance? 
We are an equal opportunity employer, are we not?"). 
5 /d. at *4. 
6 See Blanck, First Thornburgh, supra note I, at 695. 
7 See id. at 696 ("[Perkl'sjury verdict was] the largest monetary award from a jury in an [Americans 
with Disabilities Act] employment case brought by the EEOC."). 
8 CEC Entm "t, 2000 WL 1339288, at *I ("[T]he total award is statutorily capped at $300,000."). 
9 See Leye Jeannette Chrzanowski, Jury Finds Hiring and Firing Based on Ability Not Myths, Fears 
and Stereotypes, GREAT LAKES ADA NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 31, 2000, http://www.uic.edu/orgs/ada-
greatlakes/adanews/00 ljuryfinds.htm. 
10 MARK C. WEBER, DISABILITY HARASSMENT (2007). 
11 On the contrary, Perkl's foster mother testified that he "was very excited and happy when he got 
the job," proudly showed off his new uniform "and jumped up and down so high that his head hit the 
ceiling." By contrast, "Perkl came home early on the day he was terminated and went immediately to 
his room without communicating with anyone;" subsequently, "Perkl has been less attentive to his per-
sonal hygiene, fails to get up on his own in the morning, has less interest in participating in social activi-
ties or family activities and lost II pounds." CEC Entm 't, 2000 WL 1339288, at *5. 
12 The nomenclature involving people with disabilities can be confusing as well as problematic. 
"Disability," "disabilities," and "disabled," when coupled with prefixes referring to people or persons, 
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stigmatized individuals, should and can be integrated into the workplace. In 
doing so, our assertions go beyond legal protections to argue that occupa-
tionally integrating individuals with mental disabilities is also beneficial for 
their coworkers without disabilities. 
Part I of this Review Essay sets forth Weber's thesis, arguments, and 
conclusions regarding disability-based harassment. Part II briefly over-
views the influence of deeply embedded unconscious discrimination, espe-
cially as it affects occupational participation by minority groups, including 
people with disabilities. Next, Part III provides an initial treatment of why 
people with mental disabilities normatively should and practically can be 
incorporated into the workforce. In doing so, we highlight some of the less 
currently appreciated benefits of integrating these workers. We conclude 
with a few thoughts on how incorporating individuals with psycho-social 
disabilities may be seen as part of the overall dynamic of increasing flexi-
bility in the evolving workplace, including some advantages that redound to 
their nondisabled peers. 
I. DISABILITY HARASSMENT 
Mark Weber accomplishes three significant tasks in Disability Har-
assment: he demonstrates the existence of disability harassment, explains 
the harm that it causes, and provides courts with tools to prevent future in-
stances of disability-based maltreatment. Disability Harassment thereby 
contributes to the antidiscrimination literature by focusing attention on the 
comparatively less examined, but pervasive phenomenon of intentional mis-
treatment of people with disabilities. 13 In doing so, Weber deftly weaves his 
three central points through an account that is at turns both doctrinal and 
normative. Doctrinally, Disability Harassment addresses the application of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 14 in the workplace, and the ap-
plication of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEAY5 in 
schools. Weber's normative assertions regarding disability-based harass-
ment are consistent across these fields. Yet, because less effort has gone 
have become terms of art and are utilized worldwide in statutory language and in policy schemes, al-
though some disability rights advocates are adverse to them. How one draws a line between physical 
and mental disabilities, however, is open to interpretation. For the purposes of this Review Essay, psy-
cho-social disabilities and mental disabilities are intended to embrace persons with psychiatric condi-
tions (e.g., schizophrenia and bipolar disorder) as well as neuro-atypical conditions (such as the autism 
spectrum), but not intellectual disabilities (like Down Syndrome). We note that members of the latter 
group also number among the most excluded and socially stigmatized, and are therefore addressed sepa-
rately in other scholarship by the authors. 
13 See also Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 
1079 (2002); Mark C. Weber, Exile and the Kingdom: Integration, Harassment, and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 63 MD. L. REv. 162 (2004). 
14 42 u.s.c. § 12,101 (2000). 
15 20 u.s.c. § 1400 (2000). 
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into integrating Americans with disabilities in the workplace than in 
schools, this Review Essay focuses on workplace practices. 16 
Disability Harassment opens with powerful narratives that poignantly 
show the face of disability harassment. Sandra Spragis Flowers was ostra-
cized when her employers discovered she had HIV. Her employers and fel-
low employees stopped going to lunch with Sandra, refused to shake her 
hand, subjected her to constant drug tests and eventually fired her. 17 Ricky 
Casper's supervisors subjected him to a barrage of abuse centered on his 
learning disability. He was called a "tax write-off," told his children would 
be mentally impaired, subjected to profanity, required to repeat satisfacto-
rily completed work, and threatened by one supervisor that he would have 
sex with Casper's fiance so she could see "what good sex was." 18 
Having initiated the reader to the sort of discrimination Disability Har-
assment seeks to combat, Weber turns to the applicable legal doctrine. 
Courts have held that the ADA furnishes a cause of action for workplace 
harassment19 through Title I's prohibition of discrimination in the "terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment."20 Specifically, these courts have 
noted that the ADA's statutory language is identical to the antidiscrimina-
tion prohibitions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.21 Because the 
latter's terms routinely are interpreted to cover race- and sex-based harass-
ment claims, 22 courts have reasoned that harassment actions likewise extend 
to the realm of disability-based discrimination.23 
Disability Harassment argues that the statutory analogy between Title 
VII and Title I harassment claims is understandable but nonetheless is ulti-
mately inappropriate. 24 This is because a second statutory analogy drawn 
from Title VII harassment case law requires plaintiffs to show the harsh and 
invidious nature of the harassing conditions.25 Within the disability field, 
16 See also Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class 
Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861 (2006). 
17 WEBER, supra note 10, at 1-2. 
18 !d. at I. 
19 !d. at 30 ("In fact, courts have uniformly concluded that the ADA furnishes a cause of action to 
remedy a work environment that is hostile to persons with disabilities."); see also, e.g., Fox v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (allowing an employee with a back injury to bring a suit 
against his employer under Title I of the ADA for creating a hostile work environment). 
20 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(a) (2000). 
21 !d.§ 2000e-2(a)(l). 
22 See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 
57 (1986). 
23 WEBER, supra note 10, at 31 ("The ADA antidiscrimination provisions were drafted with lan-
guage similar to the language in Title VII that had authoritatively been construed to include hostile-
environment causes of action."); see also, e.g., Fox, 247 F.3d at 175-76 (finding a right of action under 
the ADA because it uses language drawn from Title VII). 
24 WEBER, supra note 10, at 31-35. 
25 See Ha"is, 510 U.S. at 21 ("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment ... is beyond Title VII's purview."). 
1354 
102:1351 (2008) Disabling Prejudice 
this manifests in a parallel proof requirement that the workplace is "perme-
ated with discriminatory conduct-intimidation, ridicule, insult-that is 
sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment."26 
In Weber's view, this condition has precluded many disability-based 
harassment claims because judges have not appreciated the severity of dis-
ability harassment, even in those cases with shocking fact pattems.27 To 
document this claim, the book sets forth cases where supervisors harassed 
employees in front of other coworkers by habitually referring to them as 
"lazy," "crippled," or worthless; managers condoned coworkers "routinely" 
ridiculing and jeering the oral communication of an employee with a severe 
speech disorder; and an employee with a mild developmental disability was 
derided and called "Rick Retardo"; as well as other harassing incidents.28 
Yet none of these deplorable episodes was considered severe or pervasive 
enough to impair working conditions.29 
Disability Harassment avers that the ADA contains a more specific 
provision regarding harassment than the broad interpretation drawn from 
Title VII's general antidiscrimination prohibition.30 Specifically, the ADA 
makes it "unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any in-
dividual in the exercise or enjoyment of' any protected right.31 The provi-
sion exists in addition to a separate, earlier one making retaliation 
unlawful. 32 The discrete harassment section, § 12,203(b ), likewise super-
26 Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788,804 (7th Cir. 1999). 
27 WEBER, supra note 10, at 33-35. Other commentators also challenge the propriety of the severe 
or pervasive standard for disability cases. See, e.g., Lisa Eichorn, Hostile Environment Actions, Title 
VII, and the ADA: The Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REv. 575 (2002) (arguing 
that people with disabilities have faced greater seclusion and isolation than women and minorities, and 
hence that the ADA ought to be given leeway from Title VII standards). We argue elsewhere that 
judges comprehend disability-based discrimination as being different from discrimination on the ground 
of race or sex. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16, at 886 ("[N]either judges nor scholars have felt 
comfortable replacing 'black or female workers' with 'disabled workers."'); Michael Ashley Stein, Same 
Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 
(2004) (describing a canonical view of disability discrimination that distinguishes it from "real" civil 
rights claims). 
28 WEBER, supra note 10, at 33-34. 
29 /d. The book also recounts one case in which a veteran with post-traumatic stress disorder was 
harassed by coworkers who made loud explosive noises and laughed as he hid under furniture. The 
court dismissed the case before trial on the ground that the plaintiff's "mental condition did not establish 
him as a person with a disability." /d. at 32. Yet, as Weber explains, the coworkers clearly regarded the 
victim as disabled-~me of the ADA's definitions of disability-and so the court should have gone for-
ward with the claim. /d. 
30 /d. at 43. This assertion is all the more plausible when one considers that much advocacy was re-
quired to bring about judicial recognition of race and sex-based harassment as causes of action, whereas 
the notion of harassment was already well instantiated by the time of the ADA's passage. See generally 
Catherine MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sexual Harassment 
Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813 (2002). 
31 42 u.s.c. § 12,203(b) (2000). 
32 /d. § 12,203(a) ("No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has 
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, 
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sedes the retaliation proscription because disability-based harassment inter-
feres with an employee's ability to show up to work on the same terms as 
her peers. 33 It is this "right of being there" that, in Weber's estimation, is 
the most important legal protection established by the ADA.34 Indeed, he 
grounds this right in the ADA's preamble section, which acknowledges the 
historic exclusion of people with disabilities from mainstream society and 
mandates its eradication.35 Thus, according to Disability Harassment, there 
is no basis for grafting the "severe or pervasive" standard derived from Title 
VII suits onto disability harassment claims.36 
Weber also notes other intriguing possibilities for the ADA's anti-
harassment section. First, because§ 12,203(b) covers "any person" and not 
"any person with a disability," it extends to individuals without disabilities 
who are subject to prejudicial treatment. This includes individuals who 
mistakenly are considered disabled, and nondisabled individuals who asso-
ciate with disabled persons.37 Second, the provision is not limited to an em-
ployer's vicarious liability, with the consequence that discriminatory 
coworkers and supervisors can conceivably be sued as well.38 Finally, be-
cause § 12,203(b) applies to the entire statute, disability-based harassment 
claims might be brought under the ADA's other titles covering public ser-
vices and public accommodations.39 
Apart from these doctrinal moves, the real power of Weber's analysis 
comes from its normative underpinnings. Disability Harassment consis-
tently locates its topic within the larger theoretical framework of the minor-
ity model of disability.40 According to this view, the constructed 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this 
chapter."). 
33 See WEBER, supra note I 0, at 43-46. 
34 !d. at 46. For the origin of this notion, also called "participatory justice," see Jacobus tenBroek, 
The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966). For a 
discussion in contemporary context, see Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 75,88-91 (2007). 
35 42 U.S.C. § 12,10l(a)(2}-(5) (setting forth the legislative findings regarding the historical exclu-
sion of people with disabilities from American society, including the workplace). 
36 Courts have not imposed this standard on retaliation claims. See Mondzelewski v. Pathmark 
Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1998); see also Finnegan v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 184 
F. Supp. 2d 457 (D. Md. 2002); Crane v. Vision Quest Nat'!, No. Civ.A.98-4797, 2000 WL 1230465 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 23, 2000). 
37 See 42 U.S.C. § 12,203(b); WEBER, supra note 10, at 55. 
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 12,203(b); WEBER, supra note 10, at 55-56. Notably, courts have held that 
§ 12,203(a), which contains similar language, includes liability for individual defendants. See, e.g., 
Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211 (lith Cir. 2004); Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1168 
(I I th Cir. 2003); Reg'! Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 45 n.l 
(2d Cir. 2002). 
39 See WEBER, supra note 10, at 56-57. See generally Michael E. Waterstone, The Untold Story of 
the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1807 (2005) (discussing the relative 
dearth of ADA Title II and III cases). 
40 See WEBER, supra note 10, at 13-15. 
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environment and the attitudes that it reflects play a central role in creating 
what society labels as "disability."41 Thus, factors external to a person's 
impairments determine how disabled from functioning in a given society 
that individual will be.42 The model thus suggests that the current exclusion 
based on disability is a social construct, much like the now-outmoded con-
ventions relating to race and sex.43 
In making a case for the social model of disability, Weber argues that 
architectural and communication barriers isolate people with disabilities.44 
"If barriers prevent individuals from riding the bus, entering stores, restau-
rants, and government buildings, or making use of places of public enter-
tainment," he reasons, "people with impairments will remain invisible, 
hidden, and a source of fear and unpleasant associations."45 Disability Har-
assment uses the example of the Academy Award-winning film Million 
Dollar Baby and "its apparent endorsement" of euthanizing an injured fe-
male boxer to demonstrate how society constructs a distorted view of dis-
ability, one in which life with a disability is not worth living.46 Weber 
argues that the movie, by displaying horrible and worsening conditions for 
41 A blunt version of the social model is that of feminist disability rights advocate Susan Wendell, 
who avers that "the entire physical and social organization of life" has been created with the able-bodied 
in mind. SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON 
DISABILITY 39 (1996). A more nuanced description is by philosopher and disability rights commentator 
Anita Silvers, who argues that being biologically anomalous is only viewed as abnormal due to unjust so-
cial arrangements, most notably the existence of a hostile environment that is "artificial and remediable" 
as opposed to "natural and immutable." Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE, 
DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN 8IOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 75 (Anita Silvers et 
al. eds., 1998). 
42 As explained by one of the originators of the theory: 
[The social model] is based on three major postulates: (I) the primary problems faced by disabled 
persons stem from social attitudes rather than from functional limitations; (2) all facets of the man-
made environment are shaped or molded by public policy; and (3) in a democratic society, public 
policies represent prevailing public attitudes and values. 
Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality, and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4. S. 
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STIJD. 97, 105 (1994). 
43 For elaboration of this argument, see Stein, supra note 27, at 599 ("According to this framework, 
the physical environment and the attitudes it reflects play a controlling (if not central) role in creating 
what society terms 'disability.' Thus, factors exogenous to a person's own impairments determine how 
much she can function in society."). 
44 But see Adam M. Samaha, What Good is the Social Model of Disability?, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1251 (2007) (claiming that the social model has "no policy implications" because it does not provide the 
values upon which any policy judgment must rest). 
45 WEBER, supra note 10, at 23-24. 
46 !d. at 23. Weber also points out that the film was directed by Clint Eastwood, a notable opponent 
of disability rights. !d. at 25 (citing MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, 
CHRISTOPHER REEVE, AND THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RJGHTS (2003)). For an argument that the 
onset of disability need not be seen by tort law as giving rise to hedonic damages on the ground of dimi-
nution of enjoyment of life, see Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic 
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 V AND. L. REV. 745 (2007). 
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the now-quadriplegic protagonist,47 justifies its conclusion by equating the 
protagonist's disability "with illness and death."48 This type of imagery, he 
avers, manifests in externally imposed barriers that ought to be challenged 
for effectively excluding people with disabilities from work, social activi-
ties, and educational opportunities.49 Disability Harassment is therefore 
valuable for demonstrating and discussing an ugly form of human behavior 
that people engage in and contribute to,50 but do not like to think or talk 
about. 51 
In providing examples of harassment as a form of intentional discrimi-
nation, Disability Harassment acknowledges that these cases are only the 
"tip of a very large mass."52 Weber's work draws insights from social sci-
ence research suggesting that discomfort and anxiety relating to disability 
can lead nondisabled people to deliberately stigmatize people with disabili-
ties. 53 Yet, this mass may be even larger than is acknowledged by the 
book.54 While "existential anxiety"55 can lead to harassment, intentional 
discrimination is not the only potential consequence. 
A growing body of legal and social science research suggests that the 
discomfort generated by minorities, women, and people with disabilities in 
the workplace also leads to less-acknowledged, even unconscious forms of 
discrimination.56 Like the blunt disability harassment Weber discusses, 
47 WEBER, supra note 10, at 23-24. 
48 /d. at 24. 
49 /d. at 23-24. 
50 Weber also discusses the manner in which the much publicized Terry Schiavo case distorted pub-
lic discourse regarding disability. /d. at 23; cf Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and 
Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 425 (2006) (describing the politics within the disability rights com-
munity on life and death issues). 
51 Historically, this has been the case with various types of disabilities, and perhaps especially true 
regarding individuals with intellectual disabilities, who have been subjected to involuntary institutionali-
zation and sterilization. 
52 WEBER, supra note I 0, at I. 
53 See WEBER, supra note 10, at 2 (citing Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond 
Stigma: Social Interaction, Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. Soc. ISSUES 3 (1988) for the proposition 
that stigma stems from others' reactions to people with disabilities rather than from the aspects of such 
disabilities). 
54 See generally Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue, III, Studying the Iceberg from Its Tip: A Com-
parison of Published and Unpublished Employment Discrimination Cases, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 1133 
(1990) ("[Eighty to ninety] percent of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court do not 
produce a published opinion."). 
55 The term originates with Harlan Hahn, a political scientist at the University of Southern Califor-
nia and one of the founders of the disability studies movement, who asserted that the fear of becoming 
disabled results in a desire to segregate people with disabilities from the mainstream. Harlan Hahn, An-
tidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority Group Perspective, 14 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 41, 45 (1996); Harlan Hahn, Toward a Politics of Disability: Definitions, Disciplines, and 
Policies, 22 Soc. SCI. J. 87,93-96, 100 (1985). 
56 See infra Part II. 
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courts and legislatures have found that this less blatant variant of discrimi-
nation is difficult to confront and address. 
Accordingly, the next Parts pursue Weber's arguments-involving the 
social construction of disability and the need for robust antidiscrimination 
policy to ensure inclusion-beyond the realm of intentional discrimination. 
Part II sets forth the literature on unconscious bias generally, and specifi-
cally as it relates to employees with disabilities. Part III explores ways that 
the socially imposed stereotypes, prejudice, and stigma that Weber so 
thoughtfully documents can be confronted in regard to individuals with 
psycho-social disabilities in the workplace, and explains the social benefits 
of eradicating those barriers. 
II. UNCONSCIOUS DISCRIMINATION 
By illustrating the continuing role of harassment against persons with 
disabilities, and then demonstrating the statutory bases available to remedy 
this practice, Weber provides judges, lawyers, and rights advocates with the 
means to combat disability-based stigma and subordination. Harassment is 
a particularly pernicious form of discrimination that builds and maintains 
obstructions and hierarchies between the mainstream population and those 
with differences. In this respect, Weber ably demonstrates how harassment 
and its exclusionary dynamic affect people with disabilities when they are 
characterized as "other."57 
Disability Harassment observes that many nondisabled people are un-
comfortable interacting with people with disabilities,58 a behavior that other 
commentators assert derives from animus. 59 Although there is some support 
for this position,60 most scholars believe (as does Weber) that the main psy-
chological feelings differentiating people with disabilities from the main-
stream are pity, paternalism, and existential anxiety.61 This point is ironic 
57 Weber explains that "disability harassment constantly reinforces the message that the child with 
disabilities does not belong and that nothing he or she does can change that reality." WEBER, supra note 
I 0, at 66. Consequently, these "negative attitudes that the children encounter at school are likely to fol-
low them the rest of their lives, harming them in the workplace and other settings." !d. 
58 See id. at 2 (citing Fine & Asch, supra note 53). 
59 E.g., ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963) 
(this classic treatment asserts that "we believe the person with a stigma is not quite human"); see also, 
e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,462 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) ("[The treatment of people with mental disabilities] in its virulence and big-
otry rivaled, and indeed paralleled, the worst excesses of Jim Crow."); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, 
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for Peo-
ple with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341 (1993) (identifying intolerance and discrimination as part 
and parcel ofthe reasons for excluding people with disabilities from equal social participation). 
60 See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16, at 898-99 (summarizing statutory, anecdotal, and case 
law evidence supporting this view, without opining on its veracity). 
61 See, e.g., IMAGES OF THE DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987) 
(demonstrating how the disabled are characterized as feeble or incapable, and are often objectified); Chai 
Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under the Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What Happened? Why? 
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and perhaps counterintuitive in a book about harassment wherein the most 
evident feelings toward those with disabilities are overt discrimination and 
mistreatment. This is especially true when ill treatment is attributable to 
good intentions gone astray. 
Nevertheless, it is these more complex, and at times benign or even 
well-intentioned, responses to disability that result in imperceptible judg-
ments or behaviors that over time exclude people with disabilities from so-
cial opportunities.62 As such, these socially mediated actions are analogous 
to the unconscious bias affecting mainstream societal perceptions of women 
and minorities, even amongst people who profess strong egalitarian be-
liefs.63 In both contexts, the elusive nature of this prejudice contributes to it 
being an intractable problem. 64 Such widespread preconceptions, for exam-
ple, contribute to minority group members internalizing negative self-
perceptions and disbelieving their capabilities.65 The result is a vicious cir-
cle that can make harassing behavior and the norms that support it even 
more potent. 66 
Legal literature refers to the manifestation of less acknowledged bias in 
the workplace as "unconscious" or "second generation" discrimination.67 
And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 165 (2000) ("[T]he public's need 
to define a person who uses a wheelchair as 'disabled' ... derives from the idea that disabled people 
lack value and are to be pitied."). 
62 See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 
899 (1993) ("[M]uch employment discrimination is the result of tortious acts that are most appropriately 
described as negligent."). 63 See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 331-44 (1987). This type of unconscious bias is widespread. See 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Opposite of a Great Truth Is Also True: Homage to Koan #7, in 
PERSPECTIVJSM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE YIN AND YANG OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 127, 130-38 
(John. T. Jost et al. eds., 2004) (using an "implicit association test," which assesses bias by measuring 
the spread between individual association and categorical status, to demonstrate that unconscious bias is 
widespread); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 94 CAL. L. REv. I, 5-10 (2006) (reviewing literature on unconscious bias). 
64 See generally Christine Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1279, 1290 
(1987) (describing the difficulty of breaking down legal barriers to gender equality); Michael Selmi, 
Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701,768 (2006) ("Absent the smoking 
gun, racial epithets, or other explicit exclusionary practices, it has been, and remains, hard to convince 
courts that intentional discrimination exists."). 
65 See DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE 
LIVES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES 67-69 (2003) (recounting interviews in which disabled Americans 
described socially induced self-distaste and the way that that feeling impacted their life choices). 
66 Like other self-fulfilling prophecies, this is because of a catch-22: certain workers are disadvan-
taged in the workplace because they are believed to have less value. In turn, those workers invest less in 
their own development and seek fewer opportunities commensurate with their abilities. See David A. 
Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical 
Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1640 (1991) (arguing that discrimination law should not focus on discrete 
events, but should provide incentives for nondiscriminatory employment). 67 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 63, at 8-15; Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Cate-
gories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. 
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According to this view, occupational features such as informal norms, net-
working, training, mentoring systems, and evaluations all provide ample 
cover for decisionmaking that is based on bias and stereotypes.68 As Linda 
Hamilton Krieger rightly notes, a good deal of prejudiced employment de-
cisions do not "result ... from discriminatory motivation, as current legal 
models presume, but from a variety of unintentional categorization-related 
judgment errors characterizing normal human cognitive function."69 She 
further points out that categorization is so deeply ingrained into our normal 
mode of mediating the world that we often fail to recognize when we have 
treated others differently because they do not belong to our individual group 
identity category.70 A simple but clear example of how unconscious bias 
manifests in discriminatory employment determinations is differential 
treatment by prospective employers of identically qualified job candidates 
based on the perceived ethnic origins of those candidates' names.71 Such 
discrimination may become more frequent in the modern labor marketplace 
as employment becomes less permanent, and job searches more frequent. 
Second generation discrimination thus quietly and invidiously prevents 
nonmainstream employees from equal opportunities and experiences in the 
workplace.72 Although most of the research in this area focuses on racial 
and sexual biases and stereotyping, there is reason to believe these issues 
hold just as applicable for the disability category. People with disabilities 
are often viewed as inauthentic workers/3 meaning that society has not yet 
embraced the notion that employees with disabilities have an equally valu-
REv. 1161 (1995) (suggesting that a large number of biased employment decisions result from a variety 
of unintentional categorization-related judgment errors); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment 
Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458,468-474 (2001). 
68 See Sturm, supra note 67, at 468-69; see also Bagenstos, supra note 63, at 8-9; Krieger, supra 
note 67, at 1188. 
69 Krieger, supra note 67, at 1161. 
70 /d. at 1163-64. For a defense of nonprejudical categorization as both natural and necessary, see 
FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES (2003). 
71 See generally Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
"Regarded as" Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 WIS. 
L. REV. 1283, 1283-85 (discussing employer decisions based on perceived racial origins, and suggesting 
the extension of Title VII as a remedy); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and 
Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination 
(Nat' I Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9873, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w9873. 
72 Sturm, supra note 67, at 460 ("Exclusion is frequently difficult to trace directly to intentional, 
discrete actions of particular actors, and may sometimes be visible only in the aggregate. Structures of 
decisionrnaking, opportunity, and power fail to surface these patterns of exclusion, and themselves pro-
duce differential access and opportunity."). 
73 See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16, at 913 ("Much as the circumstances of people of color 
and women were once ignored in the workplace, employers either create or continue to maintain physi-
cal and administrative environments that exclude those with disabilities."). For a discussion of "inau-
thentic workers," see Vicki Schultz, Life's Work, I 00 COLUM. L. REv. 1881, 1919-28 (2000). 
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able role to play in the workplace. 74 Social cognition research demonstrates 
convincingly that "stereotypes often work independently of invidious ani-
mus, by functioning as cognitive constructs, categories, or organizing prin-
ciples, which are triggered automatically when someone perceives a social 
event," as well as how he or she recalls those events. 75 Historical, 76 socio-
logical,77 public choice,78 and judicially influenced79 reasons also support the 
lack of acceptance of employees with disabilities. 
Courts and legislatures have been vexed by the problem of second gen-
eration discrimination. Specifically, it is unclear to what extent prevailing 
conceptions of employment discrimination law cover unconscious discrimi-
nation. Commentators weigh in on both sides of the issue. 80 In response, 
Susan Sturm advocates a "structural" approach to these problems, whereby 
courts, workplaces, employers, lawyers, and mediating organizations work 
together to construct a regime that engages in proactive problem solving. 81 
Others are less optimistic that this realistically could happen. 82 
For purposes of this Review Essay, we do not attempt comprehensive 
solutions to the pervasive issue of unconscious bias, although we have pre-
viously weighed in on approaches to address structural discrimination in the 
74 This may account for the different treatment accorded to ADA employment cases and ADA non-
employment cases. See generally Waterstone, supra note 39 (finding that ADA Title II and III cases are 
more pro-plaintiff than Title I cases). 
75 Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and "Innocent Mistakes," 
55 V AND. L. REV. 481,489--490 (2002). 
76 See, e.g., DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE 4 ( 1984) ("The very act of defining a dis-
ability category determines what is expected of the nondisabled-what injuries, diseases, incapacities, 
and problems they will be expected to tolerate in their normal working lives."). 
77 See, e.g., RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN 
THE WORKPLACE (2000) (arguing that modem disability employment practices are influenced by voca-
tional rehabilitation policies that only integrate disabled workers who have fully adapted themselves to 
the workplace). 
78 See, e.g., Richard V. Burkhauser, Post-ADA: Are People with Disabilities Expected to Work?, 
549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 71, 72-78 (1997) (questioning whether the ADA was de-
signed in a fashion that allowed the disabled the choice of working, let alone the support mechanisms 
necessary to that choice). 
79 See Stein, supra note 27, at 629-36 (describing how the Supreme Court does not view disabled 
workers as belonging in the workplace to the same degree as nondisabled workers); see also Mary 
Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 
35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 918 (2004) ("As a practical matter, persons with disabilities are far more likely 
than are blacks or women to regularly face built-in headwinds in the form of performance standards, job 
structure, or workplace environment."). 
8° Compare, e.g., AmyL. Wax, Discrimination As Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999) (arguing that 
employers should not be held liable for unconscious discrimination), with Michael Selmi, Response to 
Professor Wax: Discrimination as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999) (arguing 
that unconscious discrimination is controllable and thus should be subject to legal remedies). 
81 See Sturm, supra note 67, at 479. 
82 See Bagenstos, supra note 63, at 20-34 (expressing skepticism that Professor Sturm's recom-
mendations will work on a larger scale). 
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disability employment context. 83 Rather, we start with one of Weber's core 
arguments that discrimination must be broadly defined to bring down social 
barriers precluding people with disabilities from labor market participation. 
We apply this argument in a direction that Weber does not: to a particularly 
vexing case, that of workers (or would-be workers) with mental disabilities. 
Weber presents a compelling snapshot of the problem of harassment 
facing workers (and others) with disabilities. However, as discussed in the 
Introduction, there is a larger universe of people with psycho-social dis-
abilities who do not get the chance to work because prejudice bars their en-
try into the workplace. There are strong and pervasive unconscious biases 
against people with mental disabilities, so much so that contact theory (the 
notion that day-to-day interaction with an otherwise socially excluded 
group helps to break down prejudice),84 which Weber views as offering a 
hope for reduction of stigma,85 never has a chance to function. It is to this 
subject that we now tum. 
III. PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND EMPLOYMENT 
Individuals with psycho-social disabilities historically have been 
among the most excluded members of society. This failing has unfortu-
nately continued despite the ADA's strong employment mandate. Simi-
larly, insufficient academic attention has been paid to the employment of 
persons with psycho-social disabilities. We therefore highlight the case for 
why individuals with mental disabilities normatively should, and reasonably 
can, be included in the workplace. 
A. A Most Vexing Case 
The ADA has not increased the overall employment rate of Americans 
with disabilities. 86 Among subgroups of people with specific disabilities, 
the post-ADA experiences of individuals with psycho-social disabilities are 
among the most vexing as far as realizing the ADA's goals of achieving in-
clusive employment and economic equality.87 
83 See Stein & Waterstone, supra note 16 (advocating a form of collective action using class actions 
and disparate impact unified by a theory of "pandisability"). 
84 See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 100-04. 
85 See WEBER, supra note I 0, at 6 ("Lack of daily contact at a level of true equality with persons 
with disabilities promotes and constantly reinforces stereotypes."). 
86 See generally THE DECLINE IN EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A POLICY PUZZLE 
(David C. Stapleton & Richard V. Burkhauser eds., 2003) (collected econometric studies and policy es-
says). For a comparative perspective on why this may be so, see Michael Ashley Stein & Penelope J.S. 
Stein, Beyond Disability Civil Rights, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 1203 (2007). 
87 See Kathryn Moss et al., Mediation of Employment Discrimination Disputes Involving Persons 
with Psychiatric Disabilities, 53 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 988 (2002) (finding that employers are less 
likely to engage in mediation with employees who have psychiatric disabilities than with employees 
who have other disabilities); Jeffrey Swanson et al., Justice Disparities: Does the ADA Enforcement Sys-
tem Treat People with Psychiatric Disabilities Fairly?, 66 MD. L. REv. 94, 95 (2006) (fmding that peo-
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The vignettes in Disability Harassment make evident the harassment 
targeted at subgroups of people with diverse disabilities in the workforce.88 
This authentication is much needed, yet it still does not present as complete 
a picture as possible. Research firmly establishes that people with mental 
disabilities are subjected to greater prejudice than are people with physical 
disabilities. 89 For example, one study comparing attitudes regarding spe-
cific disabilities determined that people with psycho-social disabilities suf-
fer greater stigma than people with criminal records.90 
Adding to this difficulty, the popular media often portray people with 
mental disabilities as threatening or dangerous.91 Moreover, pervasive cul-
tural myths claim that psychiatric disabilities are either the fault of the im-
paired person (for example, for not taking their medication) or that they are 
something other than legitimate disabilities (for example, viewing a person 
with severe depression as "blue" rather than as experiencing a psychiatric 
impairment).92 Positive cultural depictions are rare, with a small number of 
pie with psychiatric disabilities are less successful in the legal system than are those with other disabili-
ties). 
88 See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 10, at 32 (discussing Glen Zale, a war veteran with post-traumatic 
stress disorder who was harassed by coworkers who would make loud noises and then laugh when he 
hid under furniture). 
89 See Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 585, 586--
87 (2003) ("[P]eople with mental disabilities are more feared, more stigmatized, discriminated against 
more often, and are seen as more likely to commit acts of violence than are people with physical dis-
abilities."); see a/so NAT'L INST. ON MENTAL HEALTH, SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON MENTAL 
HEALTH 6 (1999) (noting that although for people with physical disabilities the most common form of 
discrimination is paternalism, in the case of mental disability, discrimination is manifested as bias, dis-
trust, stereotyping, fear, embarrassment, anger, or avoidance). 
90 John L. Tringo, The Hierarchy of Preference Toward Disability Groups, 4 J. SPECIAL Eouc. 295 
(1970) (the ranking, from least stigmatized to most, was: ulcers, arthritis, asthma, diabetes, heart disease, 
amputation, blindness, deafness, stroke, cancer, old age, paraplegia, epilepsy, dwarfism, cerebral palsy, 
hunchback, tuberculosis, criminal record, mental retardation, alcoholism, mental illness); see also K.M. 
Goldstein & S. Blackman, Generalizations Regarding Deviant Groups, 37 PSYCHOL. REP. 278 (1975) 
(finding that people were most likely to have negative attitudes toward alcoholics, drug addicts, and 
criminals, followed by those with mental illness and mental retardation, and then physical disability). 
91 See Ann Hubbard, The ADA, the Workplace, and the Myth of the "Dangerous Mentally Ill," 
34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 850-52 (2001); see a/so NAT'L INST. ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 89, 
at 7 ("[In the 1990s], in comparison with the 1950s, the public's perception of mental illness more fre-
quently incorporated violent behavior."); Bruce G. Link et al., Public Conceptions of Mental Illness: 
Labels, Causes, Dangerousness, and Social Distance, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1328, 1328 (1999) 
("Rather than waning, ... stereotypes of dangerousness are actually on the increase .... "); Shirley Star, 
The Public's Ideas About Mental Illness 6 (presented at the annual meeting of the Nat'! Ass'n for Men-
tal Health, Nov. 5, 1955), available at http://www.norc.org/NR!rdonlyres/CADE8353-C5D3-4FB0-
8C84-40E2FOECECF4/0/sstar __public _1955.pdf. 
92 See generally Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism," 46 SMU L. REv. 373, 391-98 (1992) (arguing 
that prejudice against disabled people is analogous to "racism, sexism, heterosexism and ethnic big-
otry"). 
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individuals with psycho-social disabilities presented as heroic exceptions 
for "overcoming" the mammoth impediments of mental disability.93 
Michael Perlin, an intrepid advocate for individuals with psycho-social 
disabilities, suggests the root cause of these social constructs is "sanism," a 
phenomenon he characterizes as "an irrational prejudice" against mental 
disability. According to Perlin, sanism has "the same quality and character" 
as "other irrational prejudices" such as "racism, sexism, homophobia, and 
ethnic bigotry."94 Unfortunately, sanist preconceptions currently impact the 
legal system as well as the workplace. For instance, one study links this 
schema to the fact that people with psychiatric disabilities fare significantly 
worse than people with nonpsychiatric disabilities in ADA employment 
cases, both in terms of their success rates and their feelings of satisfaction 
with the process. 95 It is also notable that one legal commentator even claims 
that mentally disabled workers extract "hedonic costs" in the form of inevi-
tably negative "emotional contagions"96 in nondisabled people who are 
forced to associate with them.97 
We agree with Perlin that many existing barriers individuals with men-
tal disabilities face are socially constructed and premised on exaggerated 
and mutable baseline assumptions regarding psycho-social disability.98 So, 
too, the assumption that mental disability inevitably leads to inadequate 
93 For a discussion of the myth of overcoming disability, see Michael Ashley Stein, From Crippled 
to Disabled: The Legal Empowerment of Americans with Disabilities, 43 EMORY L.J. 245, 262--63 
(1994). 
94 Michael L. Perlin, ''Things Have Changed:" Looking at Non-Institutional Mental Disability Law 
Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 536 (2003). 
95 See Swanson et al., supra note 87, at 95, 132-36. 
96 Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the 
ADA, 94 GEO. L.J. 399, 401 (2006) ("Emotional contagion is the process by which we absorb the emo-
tions of nearby others through largely unconscious mechanisms."). We use the phrase "emotional con-
tagion" because it is a term of art applied by commentators. See, e.g., Gerald Schoenwolf, Emotional 
Contagion: Behavioral Induction in Individuals and Groups, 15 MOD. PSYCHOANALYSIS 49, 50 (1990). 
Note that some may find the phrase offensive as harkening to notions of contagion associated with of-
fensive racist beliefs. 
97 See Emens, supra note 96, at 401. The normative thrust of Emens's argument endeavors to be 
positive by arguing that hedonic costs must be borne by the employer, via her employees, as part of the 
ADA's mandate of social inclusion for persons with disabilities. We strongly disagree with Emens to 
the extent that she believes that individuals with psycho-social disabilities inescapably create emotional 
contagions and extract costs. 
98 For example, the "crazy" employee who could tum violent at any moment is largely a myth. An 
excellent analysis of this topic can be found in Hubbard, supra note 91. See also Hearing on the Nat' I 
Insts. of Health Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health, & Human Servs., Educ. & Related Agencies of 
the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 104th Cong. 377 (1996) (statement of Stephen Hyman, Director, Nat'l 
lost. of Mental Health) ("! can state without reservation that research shows no biomedical justification 
for differentiating serious mental illness from other serious and potentially chronic disorders of the 
nervous system such as stroke, brain tumor or paralysis."); Randy Borum et al., Assessing and Manag-
ing Violence Risk in Clinical Practice, J. PRAC. PSYCHIATRY & BEHAV. HEALTH 205, 208 (1996); John 
Monahan & Jean Arnold, Violence by People with Menta/Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates 
and Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J. 67,70 (1996). 
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work performance.99 Accordingly, the next sections elaborate our argu-
ments for why occupational integration is socially beneficial as well as 
practically feasible. 
B. The Importance of Integrating People with Mental Disabilities 
into the Workplace 
Although a few commentators discuss the normative desirability of in-
tegrating people with psycho-social disabilities into the workplace, discus-
sions of the multifarious advantages that accrue to society, workplaces, and 
fellow employees without psycho-social disabilities are notably absent in 
the legal literature. We therefore set forth in this Section an initial precis of 
these positive effects. 
1. Social Benefits to Society.-Integrating persons with mental dis-
abilities into the workplace creates a society-wide social benefit by helping 
to erode existing prejudices and misconceptions regarding the group. This 
dynamic has long been recognized by contact theory, a key theoretical un-
derpinning of the larger antidiscrimination project. Originally developed in 
the race context, contact theory posits that socially constructed stereotypes 
and hostility can be improved by close contact between members of differ-
ent races. 100 This notion was a key part of the assault against "separate but 
equal" in Brown v. Board of Education. 101 
Although contact theory (but not its normative goals) has been criti-
cized as naive and overly simplistic, 102 it generally has been defended as 
empirically robust and has withstood the test of time. 103 Because the work-
place is a social arena where people work together closely, it has proven a 
particularly fertile ground for helping to overcome discriminatory animus 
by putting members of disliked or simply unfamiliar groups alongside 
mainstream society members who might otherwise be potential discrimina-
tors.104 Yet contact theory has been underapplied regarding individuals with 
psycho-social disabilities, and to the extent that it has been discussed, 
99 See Hubbard, supra note 91, at 892-93 ("[I]t is hard to imagine a job for which a diagnosis of a 
mental disorder would 'by its very nature' prevent a person from performing the job ... . ");see also 
James C. Beck, Epidemiology of Mental Disorder and Violence: Beliefs and Research Findings, 
2 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY I, 5 (1994). 
100 See GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 264, 267 (1958); see also GUNNAR 
MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1962). 
101 347 U.S. 483,494-95 (1954). 
102 See, e.g., Lee Sigelman & Susan Welch, The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Black-White Inter-
action and Positive Racial Attitudes, 71 Soc. FORCES 781,781-82 (1993) (finding empirical support for 
contact theory). 
103 This is the thesis of a persuasive book. CYNTHIA ESTIUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW 
WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 74-76 (2003). 
104 /d. at I 03-17. Unfortunately, Estlund omits individuals with disabilities from an otherwise in-
clusive book. 
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commentators, including Weber, focus on its limits rather than on its poten-
tial. Nor has contact theory been developed in the context of the growing 
prevalence of information and communication technology, wherein indi-
viduals with psycho-social disabilities can interact with fellow workers 
while also maintaining a comfortable distance. 
Empirical evidence substantiates the idea that occupational contact can 
change attitudes toward individuals with discemable disabilities. 105 One 
study, based on a vignette asking people to judge the work performance of a 
secretary who used a wheelchair, concluded that people who had previously 
hired, worked with, or supervised an employee with a disability ranked the 
secretary higher. 106 Similarly, in the educational context, another study 
found that students who had exposure to and familiarity with individuals 
with disabilities exhibited more positive attitudes toward disabled stu-
dents.107 And a study of nurses' attitudes toward their patients with disabili-
ties found that prior work and clinical experiences with this population 
resulted in favorable perceptions of people with disabilities. 108 
Research likewise suggests that contact increases tolerance and posi-
tive attitudes toward workers with psycho-social disabilities. 109 One empiri-
cal study compared the attitudes of employers who respectively did and did 
not employ people with psychiatric disabilities. 110 It found that employers 
with mentally disabled workers perceived it to be significantly easier to ac-
commodate those disabilities than did nonemployers of similarly situated 
workers. 111 The study also found that the employers with psycho-socially 
disabled employees were significantly more likely than the nonemployers to 
rebut social stereotypes and equally value those employees with disabilities. 
Specifically, employers with mentally disabled workers believed that em-
ployees with mental disabilities display equivalent motivation to work, fol-
105 The subjects of these particular studies possessed discernable physical disabilities. Although 
more research regarding contact theory and mental disabilities is needed, as the subsequent paragraph 
discusses, there is evidence that the same conclusions should apply, at least to individuals with discern-
able mental disabilities. 
106 Cheryl H. Smith et al., Attitudes Toward & Peiformance Evaluations of Workers with Disabili-
ties, 16 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 39 (1985); see also Gil Elmaleh, A Study of Attitudes Toward 
Employees with Disabilities 87 (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yeshiva University) (on file 
with the Northwestern University Law Review) (reporting on a questionnaire-based study finding a rela-
tionship between contact with disabled people and positive attitudes toward them). 
107 See James A. Pitman & John R. Slate, Students' Familiarity with and Attitudes Toward the 
Rights of Students Who are Disabled, 18 J. APPLIED REHAB. COUNSELING 38,39 (1993). 
108 See Barbara Biordi & Marilyn H. Oermann, The Effect of Prior Experiences in a Rehabilitation 
Setting on Students' Attitudes Toward the Disabled, 18 REHAB. NURSING 95-98 (1993). 
109 See OFF. OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-BP-BBS-124, PSYCHIATRIC 
DISABILITIES, EMPLOYMENT, AND THE ADA 80 ( 1994) [hereinafter OT A REPORT). 
110 See J.A. Cook & Lisa Razzano, Cultivation and Maintenance of Relationships with Employers of 
Persons with Psychiatric Disabilities, 17 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHAB. J. I 03 ( 1994 ). 
111 /d. at 110. 
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low directions equally well, are not more likely to be injured on the job, and 
are not quicker to anger than are other workers. 112 
Another study examined employer attitudes toward hiring persons with 
psycho-social disabilities in four particular areas (symptomatology, work 
personality, work performance, and administrative concerns) across eight 
employment sectors. 113 The results of this analysis show that employers 
with a history of hiring persons with mental disabilities expressed signifi-
cantly lower levels of concern about work performance and administrative 
challenges. 114 In consequence, the researchers suggested that experience in 
hiring persons with psycho-social disabilities may lead to the lessening of 
an employer's concerns regarding those individuals. 115 They further sug-
gested "that fears about psycho-social disabilities are allayed when persons 
with disabilities are successfully employed" and demonstrate that they need 
not burden employers. 116 These results confirm earlier analyses. Moreover, 
various studies show that educational interventions, sensitivity trainings, 
and mentoring programs can be effective in changing beliefs and attitudes 
about disability. 117 In sum, empirical evidence demonstrates that stereo-
types about mental disability are malleable and amenable to change through 
inclusive workplaces. 
Changing attitudes are of great social benefit as part of a larger effort 
to make the workplace, and through it society at large, more inclusive of in-
dividuals with differences. Historically, women, African Americans, and 
people with disabilities have been viewed by society as atypical workers. 
112 /d. 
113 Edward Diksa & E. Sally Rogers, Employer Concerns About Hiring Persons with Psychiatric 
Disability: Results of the Employer Attitude Questionnaire, 40 REHAB. COUNSELING BULL. 31 ( 1996). 
114 !d. at 38. 
115 !d. at 41. 
116 !d.; see, e.g., J.M. Levy et al., Employment of Persons with Severe Disabilities in Large Busi-
nesses in the United States, 14 INT'L J. REHAB. RES. 323-32 (1991) (finding that employers with previ-
ous experience in hiring persons with disabilities were more willing to hire persons with disabilities 
again). 
117 See Courtney Shelton Hunt & Brandon Hunt, Changing Attitudes Toward People with Disabili-
ties: Experimenting with an Educational Intervention, 16 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 266, 274--76 (2004) 
("Although training professionals could develop entire programs focused on issues associated with peo-
ple with disabilities, such extensive efforts may not be necessary. Even a brief lecture ... can signifi-
cantly influence people's attitudes .... [I]t could be relatively easy to incorporate training on people 
with disabilities into existing programs, such as diversity training."). See generally David Hagner, What 
We Know About Preventing and Managing Coworker Resentment or Rejection, 34 J. APPLIED REHAB. 
COUNSELING 28 (2003) (on the effectiveness of mentoring); Robert Loo, Attitudes Toward Employing 
Persons with Disabilities: A Test of the Sympathy-Discomfort Categories, 34 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 
2200, 2212 (2004) (suggesting that a simple self-assessment exercise regarding attitudes toward disabili-
ties in training could cause employees to critically reflect on their own attitudes); Frank R. Rusch et al., 
Descriptive Analysis of Interactions Between Co-Workers and Supported Employees, 29 MENTAL 
RETARDATION 207, 210 (1991) (noting a "striking" finding that a large percentage of coworkers sup-
ported employees with mental retardation in the workplace). 
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When adjustments are made, they happen last to unfamiliar differences. 118 Bi-
ases and misperceptions fall away when differences become more familiar. 
Assertions once made about women and African Americans, for example, are 
now considered unacceptable. 119 Eliminating parallel biases and mispercep-
tions that unnecessarily exclude people with mental disabilities from the 
workplace is the next step in this progressive social reconstruction. In this re-
spect, workplace integration of individuals with psycho-social disabilities 
can achieve several important attitudinal changes that are normatively bene-
ficial to a diverse society. As Professor Sturm notes in the race and gender 
context, "[t]he project of achieving inclusive institutions is not only about 
eliminating discrimination or even increasing the representation of previ-
ously excluded groups. It is about creating the conditions enabling people 
of all races and genders to realize their capabilities as they understand 
them."120 Removing institutional barriers thereby fosters the more general 
goal of full and fair participation for all groups. 121 
Congress passed the ADA to end the historic isolation and segregation 
of disabled persons; 122 to combat discrimination in employment for a par-
ticularly vulnerable group; 123 and to create equality of opportunity, full par-
ticipation in community life, and economic self sufficiencyY4 People with 
mental disabilities are among those in the most, not least, need of the 
ADA's protections. For people with psycho-social disabilities (like all peo-
ple) securing and maintaining gainful employment is crucial to economic 
self-sufficiency. 125 
More trenchantly, employment is a hallmark of true citizenship because 
it enables individuals to participate meaningfully in society. 126 As one com-
mentator notes, "paid work, and even full-time work, is becoming a nearly 
118 See generally Stein, supra note 27. 
119 !d. at 584; see also Anita Silvers & Michael Ashley Stein, Disability, Equal Protection, and the 
Supreme Court: Standing at the Crossroads of Progressive and Retrogressive Logic in Constitutional 
Classification, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 81, 82 (2002) (arguing that stereotypes regarding woman are 
no longer the subject of judicial deference). 
120 See Susan Sturm, The Architecture of Inclusion: Advancing Workplace Equity in Higher Educa-
tion, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 247,250 (2006). 
121 /d. 
122 42 U.S.C. § 12,101A(2) (2000). 
123 /d.§ 12,101A(3) (describing the legislation's goal of ending discrimination in employment); see 
also id. § 12,101A(6)-(7) (describing the disabled as a discrete and insular minority). 
124 For an account of the ADA as "a perfect storm" that combined politically compatible liberal and 
neoclassical goals of removing disabled people from federal government dependency, see Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 921 
(2003). 
125 See generally id. See also Swanson et al., supra note 87, at 116-17 (on the economic benefits of 
employment for people with mental disabilities). 
126 See Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, Employment Discrimination, 
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. Rrs. L.J. 79, 142 (2006) ("Maintain-
ing gainful employment is a prerequisite to being seen as a full citizen."). 
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universal experience of adult life."127 The workplace is the one social forum 
that brings diverse communities together. 128 It is where meaningful conver-
sations occur, where meaningful relationships form, and where loyalty to 
coworkers is forged. 129 Being a part of this community is a crucial way for 
people with disabilities to be full members of society, and to be deemed as 
such. 130 Likewise, including mentally disabled people in the workplace 
provides them a mechanism through which to positively affect the lives of 
their coworkers. 
Integrating individuals with psycho-social disabilities, specifically, 
also counteracts a number of pervasive misconceptions, the elimination of 
each of which redounds to society's benefit. First is the erroneous notion 
that mentally disabled people are a distinct and separate group, apart from 
the social norm. In fact, "[a]bout half of all the people in the United States 
will develop one or more mental disorders in their lifetimes" and in the 
course of "any year, one of every four people in this country fits the defini-
tion of 'mentally ill. "'131 A second myth ascribes permanence to mental 
disability. Yet, people with significant psycho-social disabilities, including 
schizophrenia spectrum disorder, often recover sufficiently to maintain suc-
cessful employment. 132 
Perhaps the most significant cultural myth is the most obvious one: the 
notion that group members are unable to be effective employees. 133 Exam-
127 ESTLUND, supra note I 03, at 23. 
128 /d. at 3 ("[T]he typical workplace is a veritable hotbed of sociability and cooperation, of con-
structive and mostly friendly interactions among co-workers day after day, and often year after year. ... 
of all the places where adults interact with others, the workplace is likely to the most demographically 
diverse." (emphasis added)). 
129 Estlund examines these bonds that are formed at work in detail. "[W]orking adults have more 
meaningful conversations-conversations about things that they consider important-with co-workers 
than anyone outside of their families." See ESTLUND, supra note I 03, at 24. "Over weeks, months, or 
years of working together, co-workers learn about each others' lives and develop feelings of affection, 
empathy, sympathy, and loyalty for each other." !d. at 6. "Loyalty to companies may be disappearing, 
but loyalty to colleagues is not." /d. at 87; see also Swanson et al., supra note 87, at 116-17 ("The rami-
fications of employment discrimination [for people with mental disabilities] are enormous. The ability 
to find and maintain a job is essential to full inclusion in everyday life. In addition to the economic 
benefits it provides, employment offers the chance for independence, the improvement of skills, friend-
ships, self-esteem, a sense of purpose, and meaningful participation in society."). 
130 See Smith, supra note 126, at 142 ("[S]ociety's perception of a 'disabled' person is one who 
does not work and therefore is not a full, responsible member of society."); Sturm, supra note 120, at 
324 ("Workplaces are important intermediate institutions through which citizens make their voices heard 
and determine their opportunity to participate fully in economic and political life."). 
131 William J. Cromie, Half of Us Suffer from Menta/Illness, Survey Finds, HARV. U. GAZETTE, 
June 16, 2005, available at http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/06.16/05-suicide.html. 
132 See Zlatka Russinova et al., Correlates of Vocational Recovery for Persons with Schizophrenia, 
14 lNT'L REv. PSYCHIATRY 303, 306 (2002) (reporting that seventy-five percent of schizophrenic study 
participants had uninterrupted employment in the previous two years). 
133 See Schultz, supra note 73, at 1892 (first using the term "inauthentic workers" in the context of 
views associated with women employees); see also Harlan Hahn, Advertising the Acceptably Employ-
able Image: Disability and Capitalism, 15 POL'Y STUD. J. 551 (1987) (averring that the dominant model 
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ples of people with mental disabilities who have been successful in the 
workplace demonstrate that this is indeed a myth. Elyn Saks, the Associate 
Dean and Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, Psychology, and Psychiatry and 
the Behavioral Sciences at the University of Southern California (USC) 
Law School, recently wrote a book about her experiences as a law professor 
with schizophrenia. 134 Saks, whose condition was so pronounced that she 
spent time in mental hospitals, details the many times she was placed in re-
straints against her will. 135 That she was forced to keep her disability a se-
cret until writing her book is a testament to the stigma, stereotypes, and 
societal dismissal she witnessed. 136 Saks considers herself fortunate that her 
colleagues at USC have been understanding and allowed modifications such 
as substituting teaching loads (that cause anxiety, which can trigger psy-
chotic episodes) with research responsibilities. 137 
Saks, of course, is not alone as a person with a mental disability who 
has achieved professional success, even in legal academia. James Jones, a 
professor of law at the University of Louisville Law School, recently wrote 
of his own (heretofore secret) battle with mental illness, in his case bipolar 
disorder. 138 His account sounds themes similar to Professor Saks's: self-
accommodation and nondisclosure because of fear of stigma from col-
leagues and students. 139 Susan Stefan argues that people with psychiatric 
disabilities do not just work in fast food, yard work, or as janitors. 140 
Rather, as she details, they are senators, television journalists, print journal-
ists, clinical psychologists, and astronauts. 141 One might also note Ludwig 
of image projected by employers seeking to develop an "industrial reserve army" was one that excluded 
the participation of workers with disabilities). Carrying the point of exclusion even further, historian 
Deborah Stone argues that "[t]he very act of defining a disability category determines what is expected 
of the nondisabled-what injuries, diseases, incapacities, and problems they will be expected to tolerate 
in their normal working lives." STONE, supra note 76, at 4. 
134 See EL YN SAKS, THE CENTER CANNOT HOLD (2007). 
135 !d. 
136 In one particularly compelling vignette, Professor Saks describes how she applied for a volun-
teer position at a facility she had been previously committed to as a patient. When the head of volun-
teers learned about Saks's history, she withdrew the volunteer opportunity. !d. at 105-06. 
137 !d. at 335. 
138 See James T.R. Jones, Walking the Tightrope of Bipolar Disorder: The Secret Life of a Law Pro-
fessor, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 349 (2008). 
139 See generally id. 
140 SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH 
MENTAL DISABILITIES 7 (2002). 
141 See id. at 7-8; see also KATHY CRONKJTE, ON THE EDGE OF DARKNESS: CONVERSATIONS 
ABOUT CONQUERING DEPRESSION 13-20 (1994) (on Mike Wallace's account of his battles with depres-
sion); MARTHA MANNING, UNDERCURRENTS (1994) (clinical psychologist); TRACY THOMPSON, THE 
BEAST: A RECKONING WITH DEPRESSION (1995) (print journalist); Dana Parsons, Bad Moods: Manic-
Depressives Worry About Violence Giving Ailment Bad Name, L.A. TIMES, Feb. I, 1989 (on astronaut 
Buzz Aldrin). 
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van Beethoven, 142 Winston Churchill, 143 Charles Dickens, 144 Albert Ein-
stein,145 Abraham Lincoln, 146 or Isaac Newton. 147 In many ways, the work-
place success of individuals with mental disabilities demonstrates how real-
life events are outpacing legal reform and academic discussion: large num-
bers of people with mental disabilities already exist in the workplace, albeit 
perhaps under fear of discovery. 148 
Altering the expectations regarding work for individuals with psycho-
social disabilities enables them to flourish and contribute greatly to soci-
ety.149 Open and inclusive employment could assist in breaking down the 
cultural taboo that requires mental disability to be hidden and unspoken, 
which is in itself a sizeable burden to those with psycho-social disabilities 
and their families. Providing positive cultural images of people with mental 
disabilities can also alter broad misperceptions regarding their capabilities 
and better enable them to lead valued and productive lives. By lessening 
the impact of external factors, these effects might also potentially allow 
those individuals to experience less severe disabilities. 
2. Economic Benefits to Society.-There are significant economic 
benefits to society that can be achieved by integrating people with mental 
142 D. JABLOW HERSHMAN & JULIAN LiEB, THE KEY TO GENIUS 63-80 (1988) (on Beethoven's out-
bursts of anger, mood shifts, depression, manic episodes, and suicidal tendencies). 143 Richard L. Worsnop, An Ancient Malady, 37 CQ RESEARCHER 866 (Oct. 9, 1992) (on 
Churchill's melancholy). 144 HERSHMAN & LiEB, supra note 142, at 106--08 (on Dickens's mania and mood swings). 145 ANTHONY STORR, THE DYNAMICS OF CREATION 61 (1972) (on Einstein's "schizoid detach-
ment"). 
146 Worsnop, supra note 143, at 870 (on Lincoln's depression). 147 HERSHMAN & LEIB, supra note 142, at 46, 49 (on Newton's manic-depression and paranoia). 
Although the political arena is not the same as the workplace, it can provide a barometer for evolving 
social attitudes, not least of all because of the intense scrutiny to which it is subjected. In 1964 and 
1988, allegations about lack of "psychological fitness" to be President helped derail the presidential 
candidacies of Barry Goldwater and Michael Dukakis, respectively. Yet in 1990, Lawton Chiles won 
the Florida gubernatorial race despite acknowledging his depression. In 1992, the medical records of 
Nydia Velasquez, a candidate for the House, revealed depression, drug and alcohol abuse, and an at-
tempted suicide. She assured the voters that counseling had helped her, and won the election with sev-
enty-seven percent of the vote. OTA REPORT, supra note 109, at 33-34. 148 See Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment 
Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271 (2000). 149 Commentators also aver that employing workers with mental disabilities prevents socially harm-
ful "churning." Samuel R. Bagenstos defines churning as a process in which "employees with hidden 
conditions experience repeated cycles of being hired by unknowing employers, discharged when their 
conditions are discovered, and then hired again by different unknowing employers." Samuel R. Bagen-
stos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 463 (2000) (also noting that churn-
ing is inefficient because it creates "friction" in the labor market without improving the quality of 
matches between employers and employees). Given the pervasive prejudice against persons with psy-
cho-social disabilities in the workplace, one has to wonder how often people with mental disabilities are 
repeatedly hired. 
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disabilities into the workforce. 150 Simply put, social dependency, the option 
when people with mental disabilities are not working, is expensive. 151 Gen-
eral disability-related public assistance obligations exceed $120 billion an-
nually;152 and specifically, social insurance programs are used 
disproportionately by persons with mental disabilities, and remain a hugely 
increasing trend. 153 Occupational exclusion also creates a norm of non work, 
which carries with it additional social dependency costs, 154 including harder-
to-quantify costs borne by families and friends of unemployed individuals 
with psycho-social disabilities, who often must take on these obligations.155 
Additionally, studies show that hiring people with disabilities generally 
can lower taxpayers' general burdens156 and benefit the national economy. 157 
One report, for example, estimated that for every one million disabled peo-
ple employed, 
there would be as much as a $21.2 billion annual increase in earned income; a 
$1.2 billion annual decrease in means-tested cash income payments; a $286 
million annual decrease in the use of food stamps; a $1.8 billion decrease in 
Supplemental Security Income payments; 284,000 fewer people using Medi-
caid and 166,000 fewer people using Medicare. 158 
Indeed, Samuel Bagenstos persuasively demonstrates that the ADA was in 
large part "sold" to Congress as an effective means of decreasing disability-
150 See generally Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 
53 DUKE L.J. 79, 167-77 (2003) (describing Kaldor-Hicks socially beneficial workplace accommoda-
tions). 
151 See Bagenstos, supra note 149, at 463 ("[B]ringing people with disabilities into the workforce 
avoids the very significant social costs of dependency."); Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications 
of Title I, 85 IOWA L. REv. 1671, 1677-81 (2000) (presenting empirical studies on the costs of depend-
ency). 
152 David I. Levine, Reinventing Disability Policy I (lnst. of Indus. Relations, Working Paper No. 
65, 1997). 
153 See STEFAN, supra note 140, at 17. 
154 See AmyL. Wax, Disability, Reciprocity, and "Real Efficiency": A Unified Approach, 44 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2003) (emphasizing the costs of a norm of nonemployment). 
155 For a discussion of how these obligations are gender-skewed, see JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING 
GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). For a discussion of 
how and why societies ought to compensate for that imbalance, see Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities 
and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens, 30 PHIL. TOPICS 133 (2002). See generally 
EVA FEDER KlTTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY (1999) (assert-
ing the social benefits of care giving in the disability context). 
156 See, e.g., Stein, supra note 151, at 1676 n.26 (citing both The JWOD Program: Providing Cost 
Savings to the Federal Government by Employing People with Disabilities (Feb. 6, 1998) and Taxpayer 
Return Study, California Department of Rehabilitation Mental Health Cooperative Programs (Oct. 
1995) to show that the federal government and the state of California saved a significant amount of 
money by employing disabled people). 
157 See Thomas N. Chirikos, Aggregate Economic Losses from Disability in the United States: A 
Preliminary Assay, 67 MILBANK Q. (SUPP. 2) 59 (1989). 
158 See Patricia Digh, People with Disabilities Show What They Can Do, HRMAGAZINE, June 1998, 
at 141, 144 (citing Rutgers University economist Douglas Kruse). 
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based dependency on public resources. 159 Although it is difficult to disag-
gregate social costs according to disability-specific status, it does not make 
sense to accept that the ADA can work to integrate one population of peo-
ple with disabilities, but not another. 160 
A further, significant benefit is that eliminating workplace discrimina-
tion against individuals with mental disabilities encourages people within 
that group to more fully invest in their own human capital to develop their 
potential, and thereby add to the talent pool of people in the workforce. 161 
Individuals with psycho-social disabilities, much like other minority group 
members, will not invest in their own development if they are signaled that 
certain career paths or other opportunities are inappropriate or unattain-
able.162 The result is a vicious circle: people are not in a position to chal-
lenge exclusion from particular prospects if they do not first consider those 
options viable. 163 By contrast, altering the American workplace environ-
ment to include individuals with mental disabilities in turn creates a strong 
incentive for those putative workers to enable their abilities to flourish and, 
in doing so, add talents and abilities to the workplace and society. 
3. Benefits to Workplaces.-Making employment opportunities in-
clusive to people with mental disabilities has several benefits that accrue to 
employers, nondisabled employees, and the workplace environment. 164 To 
159 Bagenstos, supra note 124, at 926--27. These arguments beg the question, raised in 1997 by 
Burkhauser, whether despite tbese intentions tbe ADA was effectively designed to increase employment 
opportunities for disabled workers. See Burkhauser, supra note 78. For a recent response in the nega-
tive, see Stein & Stein, supra note 86. 
160 See generally David A. Weisbach, A Welfarist Approach to Disabilities (John M. Olin Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 355, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=l008985 (proposing ways 
that the tax system can compensate for the greater costs generally associated with economically discern-
able disabilities). 
161 The desirability of self-investment, and the converse undesirability of underinvestment, is a 
proposition held by a variety of commentators from divergent perspectives. Compare, e.g., Gary S. 
Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. ECON. 9, 9 (1962) ("[Invest-
ment in human capital will] improve tbe physical and mental abilities of people and thereby raise real 
income prospects"), with Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalism: Affirmative Protections for People with Dis-
abilities, Illness and Parenting Responsibilities Under United States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 
217-20 (1997) ("The United States has not facilitated long-term investment in human capital through 
social market protection. If our choices were based on a careful study of the experience of other coun-
tries ratber than unexamined rhetoric, we might make different and more humane choices."). 
162 See Michael Ashley Stein, Under the Empirical Radar: An Initial Expressive Law Analysis of 
the ADA, 90 VA. L. REv. 1151, 1157-58 (2004) ("[S]ocietal pressure can prevent persons with disabili-
ties from having a sense of entitlement in tbe workforce and in society as a whole."). 
163 See supra note 66; see also Strauss, supra note 66, at I 640 ("Statistical discrimination encour-
ages minorities to underinvest in human capital, which in turn makes statistical discrimination ra-
tional."). 
164 See generally Heidi M. Berven & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Part 11-Patents and Innovations in Assistive Technology, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS 
& PUB. POL'Y 9, 85-89 (1998) (arguing for tbe wider application of technology conventionally believed 
to be limited to use strictly for individuals witb disabilities). 
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begin with, it is unclear whether these workers actually require accommo-
dations, 165 and if they do require accommodations, whether these accommo-
dations carry any significant cost. 166 It stands to reason that the majority of 
accommodations will involve reconsidering methods of job performance, 
rather than purchasing or providing physical alterations. There is also a 
wealth of anecdotal evidence that people with psycho-social disabilities are 
already in the workplace because they self-accommodate their differences. 
In the case of schizophrenia, for example, they set aside time to focus away 
outside voices. 167 
Thus, for many the issue is recognition and tolerance, not alterations to 
workplace hierarchies. 168 Consider, for example, that there is no material or 
tangible difference between a daily ten minute smoking break, a daily ten 
minute insulin injection break, and a daily ten minute isolation break to stop 
hearing voices, beyond the employer's attitude. 
Further, it bears noting that individuals with psycho-social disabilities 
are often categorized as having those conditions because they do not proc-
ess information in a neurally typical manner. Consequently, at a time when 
more standardized tests and criteria have become the norm, 169 the very crea-
tivity that in many ways characterizes mental disability, 170 and that has in 
the past served to exclude the group from the workplace, may become one 
of its greatest assets. 171 People with mental disabilities may bring abilities 
165 Mental disabilities are not readily discernable--pursuant to Title I, employers cannot inquire 
into the history, existence, or extent of a person's disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12,112(d)(4)(A) (2000); see 
also Chai Feldblum, Medical Examinations and Inquiries Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A 
View from the Inside, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 521, 531 (1991) (analyzing "the medical examinations and in-
quiries section of the employment title of the ADA" using legislative history). Conversely, when a per-
son has a disability that is not readily ascertainable and does not disclose to her employer the existence 
of her disability, she will not be protected under the ADA's auspices, id., much as when a person's reli-
gious convictions prevent her from performing her employment, she is not protected under Title VII un-
less she had previously disclosed that limitation. See, e.g., Johnson v. Angelica Unif. Group, Inc., 762 
F.2d 671 (8th Cir. 1985) (denying recourse to an employee who was terminated for missing work on re-
ligious holidays because she had not informed her employer of the holidays). This raises a very interest-
ing (but secondary) issue relating to individuals without discernable disabilities. For the purposes of 
attempting to enculturate within a firm and avoid prejudice, when should a person with a nonvisible dis-
ability disclose that disability? This is an especially pertinent question if the disability in question is an 
episodic one or a mental disability that is likely to encounter strong prejudice. 
166 This subject is addressed at length elsewhere. See Stein, supra note !50, at I 03-09 (presenting 
and critiquing the accommodation cost studies in depth); Stein, supra note !51, at 1677-81 (same). 
167 See, e.g., Stefan, supra note 148, at 307-08 (citing a case of an individual self-accommodating). 
168 /d. 
169 See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004). 
170 See Claudia M. Santosa eta!., Enhanced Creativity in Bipolar Disorder Patients: A Controlled 
Study, !00 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 31 (2007) (empirically finding enhanced creativity in bipolar dis-
order patients); Diana I. Simeonova eta!., Creativity in Familial Bipolar Disorder, 39 J. PSYCHIATRIC 
REs. 623 (2005) (finding that children with bipolar disorder have enhanced creativity). 
171 For a delightful literary treatment of why "madness" defines humanity, see SEBASTIAN FAULKS, 
HUMAN TRACES (2005). 
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to a position due to the effect of their disability, for instance, an unusual de-
gree of creativity, high level of accuracy, or attention to detail. 172 Also ac-
cruing to the employer's benefit is the fact that many workers with 
disabilities have higher job retention and equal or higher performance rat-
ings on the job than do people without disabilities. 173 
An additional externality accruing to employers of persons with mental 
disabilities is that members of the organization can feel that they are acting 
in a socially responsible manner and raising awareness of diverse individu-
als within their organization. Through interaction, managers may also 
come to feel that they are better able to learn the needs of their staff and to 
communicate better with the general workforce. They may also find that 
including people with psycho-social disabilities leads to greater facility in 
providing an overall more flexible and accommodating environment. 174 
Potential workplace modifications can include altering schedules and 
allowing absences, 175 modifying supervision arrangements, reorganizing du-
ties, 176 and, rather than making a hiring decision on potential employees 
with mental disabilities in an uncomfortable setting, permitting a probation-
ary period for these employees. 177 When feasible, these steps lead to more 
productive, satisfied, and safer workplaces for all workers and can increase 
overall economic productivity and development. 178 In the larger disability 
context, employers that have made accommodations report that doing so 
has benefited their respective companies, including their workers without 
disabilities. 179 In the modem workplace, more flexibility on these schedul-
ing issues is becoming more prevalent with increased telecommuting. 
172 For a personal account, see DANIEL TAMMET, BORN ON A BLUE DAY: INSIDE THE 
EXTRAORDINARY MIND OF AN AUTISTIC SAVANT 148 (2007). 
173 See Hunt & Hunt, supra note 117, at 267. 
174 This, in essence, is the point that Susan Sturm makes more globally. See Sturm, supra note 120. 
175 See OTA REPORT, supra note 109, at 75. 
176 See Cook & Razzano, supra note II 0, at I 07-{)8. 
177 See T AMMET, supra note 172, at 927. 
178 /d.; see a/so NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DIS-
ABILITIES ACT: CHALLENGES, BEST PRACTICES, AND NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR SUCCESS 28, 36 (2007) 
(noting that diverse stakeholders observed that a more flexible workplace brings people with disabilities 
to the center of the discussion in which the workplace needs of all employees are taken into account). 
179 See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, THE IMPACT OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: 
ASSESSING THE PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE ADA 96-97 (2007) ("Almost all 
employers reported that providing the accommodations benefited the company by allowing it to retain 
and/or promote a qualified employee. Other direct benefits reported included eliminating the cost of 
training a new employee, saving on worker's compensation or insurance costs, increasing the accommo-
dated worker's productivity, improving the accommodated worker's attendance, and increasing the di-
versity of the company."). Employers also reported that making accommodations gave them an 
opportunity to display their commitment to their employees, which was something that all employees 
valued. /d. at 99. 
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In addition to more readily calculable benefits, Peter Blanck also de-
scribes "ripple effects" emanating from the provision of accommodations. 180 
Among these desirable consequences are purported higher productivity,181 
greater dedication,182 and better identification of qualified candidates for 
promotion. 183 Employers may also enjoy fewer insurance claims, reduced 
post-injury rehabilitation costs,184 an improved corporate culture,185 and 
more widespread use by workers without disabilities of efficiency-
enhancing technologies previously utilized exclusively by their peers with 
disabilities. 186 
CONCLUSION 
Mark Weber has produced a worthy contribution to the antidiscrimina-
tion literature by highlighting the pervasive existence of disability-based 
harassment, describing the ways such prejudice affects its targets, and argu-
ing that current disability law provides tools to combat that harassment. 
Throughout Disability Harassment, Weber explains and documents the so-
cially created stigma induced by the disability classification, one manifesta-
tion of which is disability harassment. Building on this point, this Review 
Essay examines the impact of unconscious and nonintentional discrimina-
tion against biologically atypical workers. It then argues that as a norma-
tive matter, the American workplace should incorporate individuals with 
psycho-social disabilities, a group widely considered to be among the most 
socially marginalized. To support that assertion, the Review Essay demon-
strates the social and economic benefits to society, and to the workplace, of 
pursuing mentally disabled occupational integration. 
Weber's book helps demonstrate that people with disabilities should be 
an integral part of society as opposed to being members of a discrete 
"other" category. In the same vein, we note that incorporating mentally 
180 See PETER DAVID BLANCK, COMMUNICATING THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, 
TRANSCENDING COMPLIANCE: 1996 FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO. 26-27 (1996). 
181 Patricia M. Owens, Editorial, Manager's Journal: Employee Disabilities Needn't Impair Profits, 
WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at A22 ("Savvy employers have figured out that a can-do attitude for em-
ployees with impairments is good for profits and productivity."). 
182 See, e.g., Stuart Silverstein, On the Job: With Help from New Technology, More Disabled Join 
the Work Force, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1998, at C5 ("What you find are employees who probably are 
more focused and more dedicated to doing quality work." (quoting EarthLink's vice president)). 
183 See Thomas W. Hale et al., Persons with Disabilities: Labor Market Activity, /994, MONTHLY 
LAB. REv., Sept. 1998, at 3, 3 (relating that the disabled are less likely to work in high paying positions 
relative to the nondisabled). 
184 See BLANCK, supra note 180, at 26-27. 
185 See id. at 8 ("[W]hen Sears hires, works with, and accommodates qualified employees with dis-
abilities, Sears enhances its ... employee morale." (quoting Chairman and CEO of Sears)). 
186 For instance, the nonvisually impaired employees of a large insurance company assimilated 
voice-recognition technology originally provided as an accommodation. See Berven & Blanck, supra 
note 164, at 85-89 (discussing faults of cost-benefit paradigms in determining whether employers suffer 
undue hardship and explaining the "ripple effect"). 
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disabled individuals should be viewed as part and parcel of the larger social 
enterprise of increasing flexibility in the evolving workplace, rather than as 
an isolated program of social justice. The combined effects of technology 
and globalization increasingly impact the way businesses conduct their af-
fairs. Whereas twenty years ago computers were rare, telecommuting un-
heard of, and "outsourcing" unrealistic, these modalities have become 
standard. 
Employers have responded by becoming increasingly diverse in their 
hiring and flexible in the ways that they conduct business. Despite the em-
ployment at will doctrine, companies are increasingly concerned with re-
taining their talented employees. By integrating workers with psycho-
social disabilities-presently among the most excluded from the work-
force-employers can learn lessons that will enable them to keep better 
hold of traditionally excluded groups, including racial minorities and 
women. 187 Thus, by embracing the most marginalized, employers may also 
reap benefits amongst other employees. 
187 See generally RliTH O'BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE 
ETHIC OF CARE (2005) (advocating for a general workplace ethic of care modeled after the ADA). 
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